We consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender aims at persuading multiple receivers to maximize a global objective that depends on all the receivers' actions. We focus on one of the most basic settings in this space where each receiver takes a binary action, conveniently denoted as action 1 and action 0. The payoff of the sender is thus a set function, depending on the set of receivers taking action 1. Each receiver's utility depends on his action and a random state of nature whose realization is a-priori unknown to receivers. The sender has an informational advantage, namely access to the realized state of nature, and can commit to a policy, a.k.a., a signaling scheme, to send a private signal regarding the realized state to each receiver.
Introduction
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to influence the decisions of others, is of substantial economic importance. As emphasized by McCloskey and Klamer [24] , persuasive interactions comprise a considerable share of economic activities. The fundamental Bayesian persuasion model [22] captures basic settings where a principle, called her the sender, tries to persuade a decision maker, called him the receiver, to take an action that is more favorable to the sender. However, in many domains, a sender needs to persuade a group of receivers and the sender's payoff function also depends on all the receivers' actions. For example, an auctioneer may want to persuade bidders in an auction, a politician may want to persuade voters in an election and an advertiser may want to persuade potential customers during marketing, etc. In these settings, the sender needs to communicate with different receivers in order to optimize a global objective that could depend on all the receivers' actions.
In this paper, we consider a basic model proposed by Arieli and Babichenko [4] and its natural generalizations. In particular, Arieli and Babichenko [4] study the persuasion setting where an informed sender tries to persuade multiple receivers to take one of two actions, w.l.o.g., denoted as action 1 and action 0. Each receiver's utility depends on his choice of actions and a random state of nature whose realization is a-priori unknown to receivers. In particular, the state of nature is drawn from a publicly known prior distribution and we assume that each receiver has no further information regarding the state of nature except its prior. Arieli and Babichenko [4] restrict their model to the case with only two states of nature, however, we allow the state to be drawn from an arbitrary abstract set. The sender possesses an informational advantage, namely, access to the realization of the state of nature. The sender's utility is a function of all the receivers' actions and possibly the state of nature. Since each receiver's action is binary, the sender's utility is a set function, in particular, a function of the set of receivers taking action 1. We assume the sender can privately release noisy information regarding the realized state of nature to each receiver via a private signaling scheme -a policy of revealing to each receiver a (possibly random) private signal that is correlated with the states of nature. Note that the signals for different receivers can be correlated. Each receiver is aware of the signaling scheme and can only receive signals that are intended for him. We are interested in the sender's optimization problem of designing the optimal private signaling scheme.
The main challenge here is to properly correlate the signals sent to different receivers -ultimately the receiver actions induced by these signals -in order to optimize the sender's global objective. Arieli and Babichenko [4] focus on the special case with binary states of nature, and provide characterizations of the optimal private signaling scheme under three different types of sender utility functions: supermodular, anonymous monotone submodular 1 and a supermajority function. Motivated by various applications of influence maximization such as viral marketing, Babichenko and Barman [5] take a computational study for general monotone submodular sender utility functions, but still in the case of binary states of nature. They present an algorithm that computes a (1 − 1 e − ǫ)-approximate signaling scheme and runs in time polynomial in the input size and 1 ǫ . Moreover, they show that this approximation ratio is almost tight, up to an ǫ, since it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility within a ratio better than (1 − 1 e ). In this paper, we focus on monotone submodular sender utility functions and consider both the case of binary states of nature as well as its generalization to multiple states.
Our Results and Techniques
As a warm-up, we also start with the case of binary states of nature. We show that in this case a (1 − 1 e )-approximate signaling scheme can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size, completely getting rid of the dependence on ǫ as in the algorithm of Babichenko and Barman [5] . Moreover, our signaling scheme is much simpler -in fact, can be explicitly constructed -with the following two distinctive properties: (i) it simply signals to each receiver independently, which we term an independent signaling scheme, to maximize the marginal probability of persuading each receiver to take action 1; (ii) it is oblivious in the sense that it does not depend on the sender's utility function, and the approximation ratio is guaranteed as long as the function is monotone submodular. We note that the algorithm of Babichenko and Barman [5] does depend on the sender's utility function since they need to compute the concave closure of the function. Inspired by the concept of correlation gap from stochastic optimization, we first prove a lemma showing that the optimal independent signaling scheme can always achieve sender utility that is at least (1 − 1 e ) fraction of the optimal. We then observe that when the state of nature is binary, the optimal independent signaling scheme is precisely the scheme that independently maximizes the probability of persuading each receiver to take action 1. It is worth noting that the approximation ratio of this simple algorithm is tight due to the hardness result by Babichenko and Barman [5] .
For the case with polynomially many states of nature, we present an algorithm that computes a (1 − 1 e )-approximate signaling scheme, modulo an additional additive loss of ǫ, and runs in time polynomial in the input size and 1 ǫ . Though the guarantee is similar to that of the case with binary states, our algorithm here requires completely different techniques. In particular, the idea for the binary-state case fails because the optimal independent signaling scheme cannot be efficiently computed when there are polynomially many states, as we will formally prove. The techniques employed by Babichnko and Barman [5] do not generalize here neither since it is tied with some solution properties which only hold for the case of binary states. Our algorithm crucially relies on a structural property of (approximately) optimal signaling schemes. Specifically, we prove that there always exists an ǫ-optimal "simple" signaling scheme that is a uniform mixture of polynomially many independent signaling schemes. Notably, this property only depends on the monotonicity of the sender's utility function and does not rely on submodularity, thus might be of independent interest for other private persuasion problems. Building on this structure, we then show how to compute a signaling scheme that (1 − 1 e )-approximates the optimal scheme of the aforementioned "simple" format.
Additional Related Work
One of the most basic models in the literature of persuasion is the Bayesian persuasion model proposed by Kamenica and Gentzkow [22] , generalizing an earlier model of Brocas and Carrillo [8] . They characterize the condition under which the sender benefits from persuading one receiver. Since [8] and [22] , there has been an explosion of study on persuasion motivated from a variety of different contexts: advertising [3, 21, 27] , auctions [6, 17, 25] , voting [2, 28] , security [29, 26] , financial regulation [18, 19] , etc. However, the algorithmic study of computing the optimal signaling scheme in these settings has only recently begun. Dughmi and Xu [13] provide an algorithmic study of the basic Bayesian persuasion model and examine the computational complexity of computing the optimal signaling scheme under different input models. Dughmi et al. [15] study the complexity of persuasion in presence of communication constraints.
Our model is most related to the recent work of persuasion with multiple receivers, which has been mainly studied in voting [2, 28, 12, 11] . Receivers (i.e., voters) in these settings also have binary actions but the sender's utility function is usually a supermajority function decided by certain voting rules. With multiple receivers, two natural types of signaling schemes have been studied. The first is that the sender has to communicate through a public channel, therefore the signal is publicly observable by all receivers. This is called a public signaling scheme, e.g., as considered by Alonso and Câmara [2] and by Cheng et al. [12] . Another type is the private signaling scheme, meaning that the sender can privately communicate by sending different signals to different receivers, e.g., as considered by Chan et al. [11] . Generally, optimal private signaling schemes induce better utility for the sender than that of public schemes; A comparison in the setting of voting is provided by Wang in [28] . The recent model by Arieli and Babichenko [4] , followed with a computational study by Babichenko and Barman [5] , are among the first to consider private persuasion with abstract classes of sender payoff functions like submodular or supermodular functions.
This work belongs to the more general literature of information structure design, a.k.a., signaling, in Bayesian games, whose exploration has recently drawn much attention from the CS community. The fundamental question here is to examine how the information structure of a game affects its equilibrium outcome, and how to induce desired equilibrium via signaling, which is inherently a computational question. Much of the literature has so far focused on auctions [17, 25, 20, 14] . Dughmi [16] initiates a complexity-theoretic study of optimal public signaling in the fundamental two-player zero-sum games, and exhibits hardness results. Cheng et al. [12] provide a general algorithmic framework which results in approximate signaling schemes for zero-sum games and auctions. Bhaskar et al. [7] present tight hardness results for public signaling in both zero-sum and network routing games.
Preliminaries

Private Bayesian Persuasion
A private persuasion game comprises a sender and a group of n receivers. Each receiver needs to take a binary action, w.l.o.g., denoted as action 1 or action 0. Each receiver's payoff depends on his own action and a common random state of nature θ drawn from an abstract set Θ of potential realizations of nature. In particular, we use u i (θ, 1), u i (θ, 0) to denote receiver i's utility for action 1 and action 0, respectively, at the state of nature θ; u i (θ) = u i (θ, 1) − u i (θ, 0) captures how much receiver i prefers action 1 over action 0 given state of nature θ. Note that u i (θ) can be negative. The sender's utility is a function of all the receiver's actions and the state of nature θ. Formally, we use f θ (S) to denote the sender's utility conditioned on the state of nature θ, where the set S consists of all receivers who choose action 1 . Throughout this paper, we assume f θ (S) is a non-negative monotone submodular function for every θ. In private persuasion, it is assumed that the state of nature is a-priori unknown to the receivers, and drawn from a publicly known prior distribution λ supported on Θ. We use λ θ to denote the probability of θ. The sender, on the other hand, has access to the realization of θ, and can commit to a policy to privately reveal noisy information to each receiver before receivers select their actions.
Specifically, the sender commits to a private signaling scheme ϕ, randomly mapping states of nature Θ to a set of signal profiles Σ 1 × Σ 2 ... × Σ n , where Σ i is the private signal set of receiver i. Note that the commitment is before any realization of the nature and the scheme ϕ is publicly known. Upon observing a realized state θ, the sender samples a signal profile σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ n ) according to ϕ and privately sends signal σ i ∈ Σ i to receiver i. We use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the probability of selecting the signal profile σ ∈ Σ = Σ 1 × Σ 2 ... × Σ n given a state of nature θ. Therefore, σ∈Σ ϕ(θ, σ) = 1 for every θ. With some abuse of notation, we use ϕ(θ) to denote the random signal profile selected by the scheme ϕ given the state θ and use ϕ θ to denote the distribution of the random variable ϕ(θ). Moreover, for each i, the marginal probability of selecting signal σ i ∈ Σ i given a state of nature θ is denoted as ϕ i (θ, σ i ). We will use σ[i] to denote the i'th component of the signal profile σ. Note that
). An algorithm implements a signaling scheme ϕ if it takes as input a state of nature θ, and samples the random variable ϕ(θ).
Given a signaling scheme ϕ, for receiver i, each signal σ i ∈ Σ i is realized with probability Pr(
Upon receiving a signal σ i , receiver i performs a Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief over the state of nature, as follows: the realized state is θ with probability λ θ ϕ i (θ, σ i )/ Pr(σ i ). Receiver i then takes action 1 if the expected utility of action 1 is greater than that of action 0. Formally, receiver i takes action 1 if
where u i (θ) = u i (θ, 1) − u i (θ, 0) captures how much receiver i prefers action 1 over action 0 given state of nature θ. In case of indifference, we assume ties are broken in favor of the sender.
A simple revelation-principle style argument [22, 4] shows that an optimal signaling scheme needs not to use more than 2 signals for each receiver, with one recommending action 1 and another recommending action 0. Such a direct scheme has signals Σ = n i=1 {0, 1} where we view 0 or 1 as the recommended action. Equivalently, each signal profile σ (i.e., a binary vector) can be viewed a subset S ⊆ [n] which consists of all receivers who are recommended action 1. Consequently, we will instead use a set S ⊆ [n] to denote a signal profile and Σ = 2 [n] to denote the set of all signal profiles. A direct private signaling scheme is then specified by variables ϕ(θ, S) for all θ ∈ Θ, S ⊆ [n]. Recall that if all the receivers follow the recommendations, the sender's utility after sending signal profile S conditioned on the state θ is precisely f θ (S). The marginal probability of recommending action 1 to receiver i conditioned on the state θ can be written as ϕ i (θ, 1) = S:i∈S ϕ(θ, S), which we denote as x θ,i . Note that ϕ i (θ, 0) = 1 − x θ,i .
We adopt the perspective of a sender looking to design ϕ to maximize the sender's expected utility. With variables ϕ(θ, S) and x θ,i , the optimal direct signaling scheme can be computed via an exponentially-large linear program.
Each σ i ∈ {0, 1} is an action recommendation to receiver i. We say the recommended action σ i is incentive compatible if receiver i's best response conditioned on σ i is indeed action σ i . The second and third constraints in LP (1) are to guarantee that the recommended action 1 and 0 are incentive compatible, respectively. We thus call these incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints. Some thoughts reveal that we can w.l.o.g. simplify LP (1) by dropping the IC constraint θ∈Θ λ θ (1 − x θ,i )u i (θ) ≤ 0 for action 0, and consider the equivalent Linear Program (2) with only IC constraints for action 1. This is due to the monotonicity of f θ (S): if recommending action 0 is not incentive compatible, revising the recommendation to be action 1 will not decrease the sender's utility. Therefore, w.l.o.g., all our reasoning will be based on LP (2) without considering the IC constraints for action 0 henceforth. When ϕ yields expected sender utility within an additive [multiplicative] ǫ of the best possible, we say it is ǫ-optimal [ǫ-approximate] in the additive [multiplicative] sense.
Exponentially-Large LP for Computing Optimal Signaling Scheme
Submodular Functions
The Multilinear Extension of Submodular Functions. Given any submodular function f (S), the multilinear extension of f (S) is defined as follows:
where x ∈ [0, 1] |X| . Notice that, F (x) can be viewed as the expectation of f (S) when the random set S independently includes each element i with probability x i . In particular, let p I x be the independent distribution with marginal x, defined by p I x (S) = i∈S
We note that F (x) is a smooth submodular function. When f (S) is non-negative and monotone, so is F (x) [10] . For our results, we will need to maximize F (x) subject to a set of linear constraints. This is NP-hard in general. However, an elegant continuous greedy process has been proposed by Calinescu et al. [10] to approximately maximize F (x) subject to fairly general constraints. Correlation Gap. A general definition of the correlation gap can be found in [1] . For our results, the following simple definition will suffice. Specifically, for any x ∈ [0, 1] |X| , let D(x) be the set of all distributions p over 2 X with fixed marginal probability Pr S∼p (i ∈ S) = x i for all i. Let p I x , as defined above, be the independent distribution with marginal probabilities x. Note that p I x ∈ D(x). For any set function f (S), the correlation gap κ is defined as follows:
Loosely speaking, the correlation gap upper bounds the "loss" of the expected function value over a random set by ignoring the correlation in the randomness. 
Warm-up: Binary States of Nature
We first consider the case with only two states of nature, denoted as θ 0 and θ 1 . Arieli and Babichenko [4] examine this setting and exhibit several properties regarding the optimal signaling schemes. Babichenko and Barman [5] propose an algorithm that computes an (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximate signaling scheme and runs in poly(n, 1 ǫ ) time. In this section, we explicitly construct a signaling scheme and prove that is serves as a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the optimal signaling scheme. The approximation ratio (1 − 1 e ) of our scheme is tight due to the NP-hardness results by Babichenko and Barman [5] . In particular, we consider the following independent signaling scheme ϕ I . Given state of nature, for each receiver i, ϕ I independently recommends action 1 to receiver i with probability x θ,i and recommends action 0 otherwise, where x θ,i 's are defined as follows:
Observe that ϕ I is precisely the scheme that independently maximizes the probability of persuading each receiver to take action 1. Note that, ϕ I only depends on the receiver's payoffs, but not the sender's payoff function f θ (S). Nevertheless, the following theorem shows that ϕ I is approximately optimal. To prove Theorem 3.1, we start with an optimization program that computes the optimal independent signaling scheme, as in Program (6) . Here the variables x θ,i denote the probability of recommending action 1 to bidder i given the state of nature θ. Theorem 3.1 follows from two lemmas: 1. The optimal independent signaling scheme serves as a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the optimal signaling scheme (Lemma 3.2); 2. When there are two states of nature, the optimal independent signaling scheme is precisely the ϕ I defined above (Lemma 3.3).
Optimal Independent Signaling Problem Lemma 3.2. Let { x θ,i } θ∈Θ,i∈[n] be an α-approximate solution to Program (6) . The following scheme serves as an α(1 − 1/e)-approximate signaling scheme: given any realized state θ, independently recommending action 1 to receiver i with probability x θ,i and action 0 otherwise.
Proof. Let ϕ * be any optimal direct signaling scheme and OP T denote the optimal sender utility. Recall that ϕ * (θ) denotes a random set S and ϕ * θ denotes its distribution. Therefore, the principle's optimal utility can be expressed as follows.
Let x * θ,i = i∈S ϕ * (θ, S) be the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to receiver i given the state of nature θ. Since ϕ * is a direct signaling scheme thus satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraints, {x * θ,i } θ∈Θ,i∈[n] form a feasible solution to Program (6). Let V al(x * ) denote the corresponding objective value of {x * θ,i } θ∈Θ,i∈ [n] in Program (6) . We now prove that V al(x * ) ≥ (1 − 1 e )OP T . We use x θ to denote the vector (x θ,1 , ..., x θ,n ) T . Observe that the objective function of Program (6) is precisely θ∈Θ λ θ E S∼p I x θ f θ (S) where p I x θ is the independent distribution with marginal x θ satisfying p I x θ (S) = i∈S x θ,i i ∈S (1 − x θ,i ). Utilizing the correlation gap for monotone submodular functions, we have
That is,
Note that the optimal objective of Program (6) is at least V al(x * ) thus is at least (1 − 1/e)OP T . If {x θ,i } θ∈Θ,i∈[n] is an α-approximate solution to Program (6), then the scheme, which independently recommends action 1 to receiver i with probability x θ,i and action 0 otherwise at state θ, α-approximates the sender utility of optimal independent signaling scheme, which then (1 − 1/e)-approximates the optimal sender utility. Therefore, the scheme is an α(1 − 1 e )-approximate signaling scheme. Lemma 3.3. When Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 }, the ϕ I defined in (5) is an optimal solution to Program (6) . (6) is monotonically increasing in x θ,i due to the monotonicity of f θ (S) and the non-negativity of λ θ (see also [10] ). The optimality of ϕ I then follows from the monotonicity. In particular, when u i (θ 0 ) < 0 and u i (θ 1 ) < 0, any feasible solution to Program (6) must satisfy x θ,i = 0 for any θ, i.e., receiver i can never be persuaded to take action 1. On the other hand, when u i (θ 0 ) ≥ 0 and u i (θ 1 ) ≥ 0, the sender can always recommend action 1 to receiver i, so we have x θ,i = 1 for any θ. Now consider the case u i (θ 0 ) ≥ 0 and u i (θ 1 ) < 0. If x θ 0 ,i < 1 at optimality, then resetting its value to 1 neither decreases the objective value due to monotonicity nor violates any constraint since u i (θ 0 ) ≥ 0. Moreover, given that x θ 0 ,i = 1, the maximum possible value of x θ 1 ,i that still maintains feasibility is precisely min{−
Proof. First observe that the objective function of Program
, 1}, as we defined in (5). The case for u i (θ 0 ) < 0 and u i (θ 1 ) ≥ 0 is similarly derived. Thus ϕ I is optimal to Program (6) .
Many States of Nature
In this section we consider the case with m = |Θ| states of nature. To design approximately optimal signaling scheme, one natural idea is to solve Program (6) and then apply Lemma 3.2. Unfortunately, it turns out that Program (6) cannot be approximated within a ratio better than (1 − 1 e ) in polynomial time unless P=NP (proof is deferred to the appendix), though we do show that a (1 − 1/e)-approximate algorithm can be obtained by properly applying the continuous greedy process [10] . (10) to a factor better than
Observation 4.1. It is NP-hard to approximate the optimal objective of Program
(1 − 1 e ).
Observation 4.2. Let m = |Θ|. There is an algorithm that runs in poly(m, n) time and computes a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution to Program (6).
Proof. First, observe that there always exists an optimal solution to Program (6) such that x θ,i = 1 for any θ, i such that u i (θ) ≥ 0. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we can pre-set these variables to be 1 and view the program as an optimization problem over x θ,i 's for all θ, i such that u i (θ) < 0. It is easy to check that these x θ,i 's form a down-monotone polytope which is determined by poly(m, n) linear constraints. Observe that the objective function of Program (6) is precisely θ∈Θ λ θ F θ (x θ ) where F θ (x) is the multilinear extension of f θ (S) and x θ = (x θ,1 , ..., x θ,n ) T , therefore the objective is smooth, monotone and submodular. As a result, the continuous greedy process produces a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution (Theorem 2.1). The negative result in Observation 4.1 shows that our previous approach for the case with binary states of nature -which achieves the tight approximation ratio there -cannot give an approximation ratio better than (1 − 1 e ) 2 in the case of multiple states of nature. This raises the following fundamental question: is the case of multiple states of nature intrinsically more difficult? In particular, can we still implement a (1 − 1/e)-approximate signaling scheme in polynomial time? Interestingly, the answer turns out to be essentially "yes". We prove the following theorem. Observe that the (1 − 1/e) 2 -approximate signaling scheme in Proposition 4.3 loses (1 − 1/e) fraction by restricting the signaling scheme for each θ to be an independent distribution and loses another (1 − 1/e) fraction by approximately computing the optimal independent signaling scheme (i.e., solving Program (6)).
To improve the approximation ratio, our key insight is that we can get rid of most of the first (1 − 1/e) loss by restricting the signaling scheme for each θ to be a uniform mixture of K independent distributions for some properly chosen K. This results in the following Optimization Program (10). Our algorithm first approximately solves this program (in the same way as in Observation 4.2) and then signal accordingly. Details are in Algorithm 1, which we instantiate with ǫ > 0 and K = 108n log(2mn)
for i = 1, ..., n; θ ∈ Θ. The proof of Theorem 4.4 relies on a structural characterization of (approximately) optimal solutions to the exponentially-large linear program (2). Since x θ,i 's are fully determined by ϕ(θ, S)'s in LP (2), we will use {ϕ(θ, S)} θ∈Θ,S∈2 [n] , or simply ϕ for convenience, to denote a feasible solution to LP (2). Fix θ, ϕ(θ) is a random variable supported on 2 [n] with distribution ϕ θ . We will call ϕ θ K-uniform if it is a uniform distribution on a multiset of size K. The following lemma shows a structural property regarding (approximately) optimal solutions to LP (2) . Notably, this property only depends on monotonicity of the sender's payoff functions and does not depend on submodularity. Its proof is deferred to the end of this section. , the optimal objective value of Program (10) is at least OP T − ǫ , where OP T is the optimal objective value of LP (2).
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, there exists a feasible solution ϕ such that: (i) ϕ achieves sender utility at least OP T − ǫ; (ii) for each θ, there exists K sets S 1 θ , ..., S K θ ⊆ [n] such that ϕ θ is a uniform distribution over
, θ ∈ Θ, and ϕ(θ, S) = 0 otherwise. Let x j θ ∈ {0, 1} n be the indicator vector of the set S (10) at the solution x equals the objective value of Program (2) at the solution ϕ, which is at least OP T − ǫ. Therefore, the optimal objective value of Program (10) is at least OP T − ǫ, as desired.
Note that the expected sender utility induced by the signaling scheme in Algorithm 1 is precisely the objective value of Program (10) 
Proof of the Structural Lemma
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. Recall that the optimal signaling scheme can be computed by solving the exponentially-large linear program (2) . Intuitively, given any optimal scheme ϕ * , we will take polynomially many samples from ϕ * θ for each θ, and prove that with strictly positive probability the corresponding empirical distributions form a solution to LP (2) that is close to optimality. However, the sampling approach usually suffers from ǫ-loss to both optimality and incentive compatibility (IC). Interestingly, it turns out that in our setting the ǫ-loss to incentive compatibility can be avoided with some careful pre-processing steps.
Roughly speaking, to get rid of the ǫ-loss in IC constraints, there are two main technical barriers. The first is to handle the estimation error in the receiver's utilities, which is inevitable due to sampling. We address this by adjusting the solution to strengthen the IC constraints so that a small estimation error would still preserve the original IC constraints. The second barrier arises when some x * θ,i 's are smaller than inverse polynomial of the precision ǫ, then poly( 1 ǫ ) samples cannot guarantee a good multiplicative estimate of x * θ,i . It turns out that this issue can be overcome by simply "giving up" on these cases and instead always recommending action 0. We show that such modification will not cause much loss to our objective.
We first introduce some convenient notation. For any receiver i, let set Θ Observe that by monotonicity there always exists an optimal signaling scheme ϕ * such that x * θ,i = 1 for every θ ∈ Θ + i . Let ϕ * be such an optimal signaling scheme and OP T denote the optimal sender utility. We now make two adjustments to the scheme ϕ * such that they do not decrease the objective value by much but is more suitable for applying concentration bounds for our probabilistic argument.
Adjustment 1: Always Recommend Action
Note that x * θ,i < ǫ 3n only when θ ∈ Θ − i , i.e., action 0 is the best action for receiver i conditioned on θ. We first adjust ϕ * to obtain a new scheme ϕ, as follows: ϕ is the same as ϕ * except that for every θ, i such that x * θ,i < ǫ 3n , ϕ always recommends action 0 to receiver i given the state of nature θ. As a result, x θ,i equals x * θ,i whenever x * θ,i ≥ ǫ 3n and equals 0 otherwise. Note that the signaling scheme is still incentive compatible.
Naturally, each adjustment above, corresponding to θ, i satisfying x * θ,i < ǫ 3n , could decrease the objective value since the marginal probability of recommending action 1 decreases. Nevertheless, this loss, denoted as L(θ, i), can be properly bounded as follows:
As a result, the aggregated loss of all the adjustments made in this step can be upper bounded by
That is, the objective value of ϕ is at least OP T − We now strengthen the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints by further adjusting the ϕ obtained from above so that a small estimation error due to sampling will still maintain the original IC constraints. For any θ, we define ϕ ′ (θ, S) = 3 3+ǫ ϕ(θ, S) for all S = I + θ , and define ϕ ′ (θ, I
That is, given state θ, any receiver i ∈ I + θ will still aways be recommended action 1. This is because, to construct ϕ ′ θ , we moved some probability mass from all other sets S to the set I + θ , therefore the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to any receiver i ∈ I + θ will not decrease. However, this marginal probability is originally 1 in the solution of ϕ. Therefore, x ′ θ,i still equals 1 for any i ∈ I + θ , or equivalently, for any θ ∈ Θ + i . Similarly, we also have x ′ θ,i = 0 whenever ϕ θ,i = 0. Let V al(ϕ) denote the objective value of a signaling scheme ϕ. We claim that V al(ϕ ′ ) ≥ OP T − + θ ) also holds in our construction. Therefore, we have
where we used the upper bound V al( ϕ) ≤ 1.
Existence of An ǫ-Optimal Solution of Small Support.
The above two steps of adjustment result in a feasible 2ǫ 3 -optimal solution ϕ ′ to LP (2) that satisfies the following properties:
Utilizing such a ϕ ′ we show that there exists an ǫ-optimal solution ϕ to LP (2) such that the distribution ϕ θ is a K-uniform distribution for every θ, where K = 108n log(2mn) ǫ 3
.
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. For each θ, independently take K = 108n log(2mn) ǫ 3
samples from the distribution ϕ ′ θ , and let ϕ θ denote the corresponding empirical distribution. Obviously, ϕ θ is a K-uniform distribution. We claim that with strictly positive probability over the randomness of the samples, ϕ is feasible to LP (2) and achieves utility at least V al(ϕ ′ ) − ǫ 3 ≥ OP T − ǫ. We first examine the objective value. Observe that the objective value V al(ϕ ′ ) can be viewed as the expectation of the random variable θ∈Θ λ θ f θ (S θ ) ∈ [0, 1], where S θ is a random set following distribution ϕ ′ θ . Our sampling procedure generates K samples for the random variable {S θ } θ∈Θ , therefore by the Hoeffding bound, with probability at least 1 − exp(−2Kǫ 2 /9) > 1 − 1/(2nm), the empirical mean is at least V al(ϕ ′ ) − ǫ/3. Now we only need to show that all the IC constraints are preserved with high probability. First, observe that if x ′ θ,i = 0, then x θ,i induced by ϕ also equals 0. This is because x ′ θ,i = E S∼ϕ ′ θ I(i ∈ S) = 0 implies that i is not contained in any S from the support of ϕ ′ θ , therefore, also not contained in any sample. Similarly, x ′ θ,i = 1 implies x θ,i = 1. To show that all the IC constraints hold, we only need to argue that x θ,i ≤ x * θ,i
for every θ ∈ Θ − i satisfying x * θ,i ≥ ǫ 3n . This holds with high probability by tail bounds. In particular, x ′ θ,i = E S∼ϕ ′ θ I(i ∈ S) and we take K samples from ϕ ′ θ . By the Chernoff bound, with probability at least
, the empirical mean x θ,i is at most (1 + ǫ/3)x ′ θ,i = x * θ,i . Note that there are at most mn choices of such θ, i. By union bound, with probability greater than 1 − (nm + 1)/(2nm) > 0, ϕ satisfies all the IC constraints thus is feasible to LP (2), and achieves objective value at least V al(ϕ ′ ) − ǫ 3 ≥ OP T − ǫ. So there must exist a feasible ǫ-optimal solution ϕ to LP (2) such that ϕ θ is K-uniform for every θ. This concludes our proof of Lemma 4.5.
Extension to Arbitrary Prior Distribution Given via a Sampling Oracle
In the most general case, the state of nature could be arbitrary and is given via a sampling oracle. Using the sampling idea from [13] , we can implement a signaling scheme in poly(n, 1 ǫ ) time that achieves objective value at least (1 − 1 e )(OP T − ǫ) and is ǫ-incentive compatible, i.e., a bi-criteria guarantee. The algorithm is simply to sample polynomially many states from the sampling oracle and then run Algorithm 1 on the empirical distribution of the samples with relaxed (by ǫ) IC constraints. The analysis is similar to that in [13] , thus is omitted here. The ǫ loss in the incentive compatibility is inevitable due to information theoretic reasons. In particular, for any c < 1 and integer K there exists a private persuasion instance with 2 states and 1 receiver such that any exactly incentive compatible and c-optimal signaling scheme must take more than K samples (see the constructed instance for Theorem 5.5 (a) in [13] ).
By viewing x θ j ,i as the probability of allocating item i to player j, the above optimization program corresponds precisely to the given SWP instance above, up to scaling of the objective, except that the allocation is now allowed to be randomized. In particular, the constraints form a partition matroid. Since any fractional allocation can be efficiently rounded to a deterministic allocation achieving the same welfare (e.g., use Pipage rounding [9, 10] ), an α−approximate solution to Program (10) yields an α−approximate deterministic allocation for the SWP instance. Since it is NP-hard to approximate SWP within a ratio better than (1 − 1 e ), the same approximation hardness holds for solving Program (10), completing the proof.
Tail Bounds
We use the following convenient forms of tail bounds.
Lemma 5.1. Let X 1 X 2 , ..., X n be n independent Bernoulli random variables with µ = n i=1 E[X i ]. Let X = n i=1 X i be their sample sum. Then, for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the following inequalities hold:
• Hoeffding Bound: Pr(X < µ − nǫ) ≤ exp(−2nǫ 2 );
• Chernoff Bound: Pr(X > (1 + ǫ)µ) ≤ exp(−ǫ 2 µ/3).
